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Abstract 
International joint ventures (IJVs) are an important modern organisational form, with their 
complexity presenting significant management and control issues.  Our research uses a cross-
sectional survey of Australian parent partners of IJVs to provide insights into the 
characteristics of Australian companies and their IJVs, performance outcomes and choices of 
parent partners management control systems (MCS) design in terms of operational areas they 
seek to control (focus), the extent to which they exercise control (extent) and the mechanisms 
of control used (formal and informal). Australian parent partners of IJVs generally are; 
partnering in countries close to Australia in the Asia Pacific, in activities similar to those they 
undertake in Australia, contributing a significant amount of resources, but overall have only a 
limited range IJV experience.  Australian parent partners focus on a limited set of controls, 
often with tighter formalised control structures.  Finally they are overall satisfied with the 
performance of their IJVs, with higher satisfaction for organisation learning and 
product/customer dimensions than financial performance. 
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 International joint ventures (IJVs) are an important modern organisational form. 
Multinational corporations use IJVs as a key option for pursuing international strategies 
(Harrigan 1988; Hergert and Morris 1988; Geringer and Woodcock 1989; Geringer 1991; 
Parkhe 1993), especially in countries where joint ventures are a regulatory condition of entry 
to domestic markets (Beamish and Banks 1987; Geringer 1991). From a strategic point of 
view, IJVs are used to exploit peripheral markets or technologies, and are perceived as critical 
elements of an organisation’s business networks, as strategic weapons for competing within 
core markets and technologies (Harrigan 1987), and as a way of facilitating inter-
organisational learning (Buckley and Casson 1988; Hamel 1991; Makhija and Ganesh 1997). 
In addition, successful IJVs create synergies and enhance economic rents to the partners 
resulting from risk reduction, economies of scale and scope, production rationalisation, 
convergence of technologies, and better local acceptance (Harrigan 1988a, 1988b; Hennart 
1988; Parkhe 1993). IJVs, therefore, represent an important and effective way for 
multinational organisations to compete globally (Perlmutter and Heenan 1986). 
Pursuing IJV strategies involves significant issues in controlling their venture operations. A 
parent partner must share control with other partner(s) and face constraints imposed by 
contractual and legal requirements. Often one partner may enjoy competitive 
cultural/language advantage and privileged access to information, and may have different 
(sometime conflicting) interests to the other IJV partner(s) (Anderson 1990; Beamish 1984; 
Fey 1995; Southworth 1994). Parent partners, therefore, face significant challenges in 
designing and operating management controls systems able to effectively monitor and control 
the operations of their IJVs (Anderson 1990; Dolan 1993a, 1993b; Luo 1995). 
Inter-organisational Collaboration 
IJVs are one of many forms of inter-organisational networks. Figure 1 summarises the 
interrelationship of the major factors that may lead to networks as a mean to achieve 
organisational objectives. In accordance with traditional organisational analysis, an 
organisation’s strategy and objectives are determined by the organisation’s own internal 
resources (strengths and weaknesses) and environmental opportunities and pressures (threats 
and opportunities). Flexibility in committing scarce resources, risk-sharing, access to critical 
business resources, increasing environmental complexity, higher degrees of market 
interrelationships, the emergence of new developing economies and the shift from traditional 
national markets to global markets are some of the factors that create significant pressures for 
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organisations to pursue a strategy of inter-organisational collaboration rather than intra-
organisational expansion, and therefore determine the ‘Need to network’ shown in Figure 1 
(Beamish 1988; Schillaci 1988; Contractor and Lorange 1988; Shenkar and Tallman 1993; 
Mjoen and Tallman 1997). 
Organisational  
strategy and 
objectives
Internal resources, 
technology and 
expertise (strengths 
and weaknesses)
Relationship with 
the environment
(threats and 
opportunities)
Need to network
 
Figure 1 Factors impacting the need to network 
 
There are many forms of networks ranging from informal to formal, short-term to long-term 
and comprising two or more partners. A joint venture is a form of inter-organisational 
network where two or more partners enter into an agreement to form a new entity (the JV) to 
undertake a given set of activities with the aim of achieving agreed objectives. Partners share 
capital, income, expenditure, profit/losses, management, risk and benefits in accordance with 
agreed arrangements and proportions. 
Historically, the term joint venture was used in the United States (US) to describe a 
speculative association of firms promoted to undertake very risky projects. With time the 
speculative nature of the venture became less important and JVs developed as a form of 
association between firms aimed at undertaking activities (rather than a project) in common 
(Schillaci 1988). Different characteristics across partners, motives, strategies or objectives, 
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different types of projects, characteristics of the operating environment, and the type of 
resources made available by parent partners are some of the features that give rise to a variety 
of forms of joint venture collaboration. 
In general, the main distinguishing characteristic of JVs is the creation of a separate entity 
owned by two or more partners who keep their own financial, operational and legal identity 
and autonomy. Also, the new entity is the result of the parent partners’ determination to 
engage in a collaborative venture, not just an investment. Many motives lead companies to 
JVs. Often, the motives differ across each partner and on many occasions may even be 
conflicting. Nevertheless, the decision to form a JV derives from the belief by each partner 
that despite different/conflicting goals, the benefits of collaboration may outweigh the costs. 
JVs can be classified into different types according to their legal or organisational features, 
location and nature of project/activities. JVs formed by companies originating from the same 
country, and operating in the same country as the parent partners, are defined as domestic 
joint ventures. When parent partners’ headquarters are located in different countries or the JV 
has a significant level of operations in more than one country the JV is considered 
international (Groot and Merchant 2000), which may operate in either developed or 
developing countries. Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of international and 
domestic JVs in developed and developing countries. 
Domestic JVs in developing countries (Cell III in Table 1) are less frequent and are generally 
motivated by the need to put together experience and resources to undertake complex and 
major projects. On the contrary, domestic JVs in developed countries (Cell I) are much more 
common, where organisations pool their resources and experience to overcome each other’s 
weaknesses and to share risk. Here the partners generally have equal shares (even if one 
partner may dominate the JV) and the collaboration may last longer. 
Table 1 Main characteristics of international and domestic JVs 
 Domestic JVs International JVs 
Developed 
countries 
Likely to provide for equal 
relationship of partners 
Longer lasting 
Lower level of uncertainty 
Lower level of conflict due to 
cultural/social barriers 
 
I 
Likely to provide for equal interest of partners 
More probability of integration 
Likely to be formed to meet increasing global 
competition 
Greater challenge and uncertainty 
Greater cultural/social barriers 
II 
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Developing 
countries 
III 
Not very common due to lower 
cooperative culture 
Used to undertake complex projects 
IV 
Increasingly developing 
Likely to provide for unequal resource contribution 
Likely to lead to a de facto dominant partner 
Used by foreign partner as a way to enter new 
markets 
Used by local partner as a way to acquire 
knowledge/technology 
Greater chance of conflicting goals/objectives. 
More likely to be imposed by government 
regulation 
Greater challenge and uncertainty 
Greater cultural/social barriers 
 
IJVs in developed countries (Cell II) are also quite common and usually motivated by the 
same reasons as domestic JVs. The acquisition of new markets, use of primary resources and 
government regulation are additional reasons to form IJVs. Similarly to domestic JVs, 
partners generally exercise similar levels of control. IJVs between companies originating from 
developed and developing countries (Cell IV) have increased significantly in recent times. 
They are often generated by government regulations imposing the JV business structure on 
international companies wishing to enter developing country markets. In this way it is hoped 
that local firms may gain experience, transfer knowledge and technology, leading in the 
medium/long term to independent operations. More significant economic, cultural and social 
differences are likely to give rise to special control issues in these IJVs. While government 
regulations may provide for equal legal shares in the joint ventures, actual resource 
contribution and other factors may determine a de facto dominance by one partner. 
A review of the literature suggests that IJVs, similar to other international operations, face 
greater operational and management challenges than domestic JVs (Groot and Merchant 
2000). In addition to the need to ‘share’ control with other partner(s), parent partners face 
difficulties in monitoring operations in settings they are not familiar with compounded by 
physical distance, by time differences, cultural barriers, social barriers, human resource and 
employee relation differences (Child and Faulkner 1998). 
In summary, the above factors all result in greater organisational complexity, making the 
management of international joint ventures a very challenging task (Child 1991; Child and 
Markoczy 1993; Beamish 1993). Traditional management control systems, performance 
evaluation procedures and accounting information used to control and evaluate fully owned 
subsidiaries or short-term specific project ventures, may not be applicable to international JVs 
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(Anderson 1990; Dolan 1993a, 1993b; Luo 1995). There is a need to identify specific issues 
and investigate factors leading to the successful design, implementation, and operation of 
efficient and effective management control and performance evaluation systems in 
international JVs. This study contributes to a better understanding of how foreign parent 
partners control the operations of their IJVs by reporting the results of an investigation of 
management control systems of Australian parent partners. In particular, we report how 
Australian parent partners control the operations of their IJVs with regard to what operational 
areas they seek to control in relation to their partner(s), their relative influence on the 
decision-making process in various functional areas and the tools they use to exercise control 
over their IJVs. 
Data Collection 
The results reported in this article were collected in 2005 as part of a larger research project 
(see Giacobbe (2007) for full details on the research method). The questionnaire was 
developed following the approach recommended by Dillman (2000). These included the 
consideration of a set of criteria to select questions to be included in the questionnaire; 
keeping questions in it as short, simple and clear as possible; constructing the survey 
questionnaire in a way that would make it easier to understand and answer; providing clear 
instructions to respondents. Most questions used in the questionnaire were derived and 
adapted from prior research. In addition, the survey was pilot tested by requesting four 
managers involved in international JVs, two academics and a manager of a consulting firm to 
complete the survey questionnaire and provide comments on the relevance and clarity of each 
question. Their comments were further discussed at face-to-face meetings or through 
telephone conversations. 
The unit of analysis was Australian parent companies of equity JVs operating outside 
Australia (equity shares in IJVs). Equity JVs were selected because of the inherent clearer 
definition of rights and obligations and the direct involvement of each partner by introducing 
resources and bearing the relevant risk. In equity IJVs parent partners acquire equity interest 
and invest capital and other resources (see Killing 1982, 1983; Groot and Merchant 2000; 
Yan and Gray 1994). 
As a database of Australian parent partners of IJVs was not available, the sample was 
compiled from a variety of sources: Austrade, financial reports of public companies and 
databases of Australian companies involved in international business. The final sample 
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comprised 439 companies. The total number of returned questionnaires was 99. Two of the 
questionnaires were not satisfactorily completed, reducing the number of useable completed 
questionnaires to 97. The overall response rate was 22.10%. As some respondents did not 
answer all questions, the number of respondents reported in the following sections may vary. 
All respondents were employed at senior managerial levels. The highest percentage of 
respondents is represented by managing directors (51.58%), followed by international 
operations managers (18.95%). They had been employed by their companies for an average of 
11.8 years (Min 1, Max 41), and in their current position for an average of 6 years (Min 0.5, 
Max 36). Given that respondents have been employed by their companies in senior positions 
for a significant period of time, it is likely that they had appropriate knowledge and 
experience about their company’s IJVs and international business involvement. 
General Characteristics of Australian Parent Partners 
We report here characteristics of respondent companies and their IJVs. 
Parent Partners 
Table 2 shows the size of the respondent companies in terms of number of employees. The 
companies cover a wide range of sizes, from 2 to 125 000 employees. Half of the respondents 
employ less than 360 people and 71.58% employ less than 1000 people. This indicates that 
Australian medium-size companies are actively engaged in IJVs. 
Table 2 Size characteristics of respondent companies 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std dev. Median 
Employees 2 125 000 3484 14 056 360 
Number of employees Number of companies % Cumulative % 
Up to 100 27 28.42 28.42 
101 to 1000 41 43.16 71.58 
1001 to 10 000 22 23.16 94.74 
More than 10 000 5 5.26 100.00 
 
Australian parent partners of IJVs are involved in a wide range of business activities. The 
majority of respondent companies (27.84%) indicated that their firms are involved in 
manufacturing activities. Quite prevalent also are mining (15.46%) and building construction 
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companies (8.25%). Seven companies (7.22%) are involved in trading activities, six (6.19%) 
in primary industry activities other than mining and five companies (5.15%) provide 
education services. A significant proportion of Australian companies involved in IJVs operate 
in a range of services-related industries, including Personal Services (7.22%), Property and 
Business Services (6.19%), Communication (5.15%), and Financial/Insurance Services 
(5.15%). These findings indicate that most Australian companies engage in IJVs production 
and mining activities where they can contribute know-how, technology and other resources, 
and take advantage of local business inputs and possibly lower production costs. 
Companies pursue a JV strategy for many reasons, including the need to access new markets, 
resources or technology, share or acquire skills, achieve economies of scale, share risk, 
minimise the uncertainty of diversification, pool resources to undertake large projects or 
improve competitiveness, and to comply with government regulation (Schillaci 1988; Hung 
1992; Harrigan 1985; Bell 1996). Companies may be motivated by a single or multiple 
objectives to pursue their strategic business alliances, which may conflict with those of their 
partners. Different motives may impact on parent partners’ management control system 
choices. 
Motives of Australian parent and their foreign partners to JVs are reported in Table 3, ranked 
in order of importance as rated by the respondents. The results indicate that Australian 
companies and their international partners are both primarily motivated by profit and growth, 
but then place different levels of importance to all other motives to JVs. For example, 
learning is much more important for international parents than Australian parents (motive 3 
compared to motive 7). This different pattern of motives is consistent with arguments in the 
literature that partners of IJVs can have different (and sometimes even conflicting) motives 
and objectives for the JV. 
Table 3 Motives 
Rank Australian company International partner 
1 Growth Profit 
2 Profit Growth 
3 Expansion to new market Knowledge exchange/learning 
4 Expansion in related products Risk-sharing 
5 Risk-sharing Expansion in related products 
6 Access resources/raw materials Expansion to new market 
7 Knowledge exchange/learning Expansion through diversification 
8 Overcoming government barriers Access resources/raw materials 
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9 Cost reduction Co-opting or blocking competition 
10 Expansion through diversification Cost reduction 
11 Co-opting or blocking competition Overcoming government barriers 
 
The literature also indicates that motives for entering JVs can have an important influence on 
parent partners’ management control system choices, as both will perceive control as the most 
critical means of fulfilling their strategic intentions (Anderson 1990; Yan and Gray 1994). 
The nature of the influence may be determined by a wide range of elements, including the 
type of specific motives, how a partner’s objectives are phrased (for example, financial/non-
financial), the breadth of partners objectives for the international JV and the fit between 
international JV’s product and the rest of a partner's business (Groot and Merchant 2000). 
Groot and Merchant (2000), for example, found some evidence of a relationship between 
parent partner objectives and the choice of focus of control. Franko (1971) found that the type 
of controls chosen by a parent partner was influenced by the strategy motivating a parent 
partner to engage in a JV. Specifically, he found that loose controls were used by parent 
partners of joint ventures resulting from a product diversification strategy, while tighter 
controls were used by parent partners of JVs to expand the geographical reach of their 
existing products. Finally, Yan and Gray (1994) found that in the interest of learning, the local 
(foreign) partner expected from the outset that control would be shifted from the other partner 
to them over time. The different pattern of JV motives for Australian parents and their 
international partners, therefore, suggest that Australian IJVs may experience the same issues 
of different control interests, focus and control system choices between the Australian and 
international parents. 
The experience of companies in international operations and their involvement in other IJVs 
are often cited as another determinant of management control system choices and as a 
potential determinant of performance outcomes of IJVs (Child and Yan 2003). It is suggested 
that companies with more extensive IJV operations experience may be better prepared to deal 
with the uncertainties and complications of sharing control with others and operating in an 
unfamiliar (and sometimes unfriendly) environment. 
Table 4 Australian companies involvement in IJVs 
Number of IJVs Number of companies % Cumulative % 
1 IJV 22 22.92 22.92 
2 to 3 IJVs 30 31.25 54.17 
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4 to 10 IJVs 33 34.38 88.54 
More than 10 IJVs 11 11.46 100.00 
 
Table 4 reports details of Australian companies’ involvement in IJVs over the last ten years. 
The average number of IJVs per surveyed company (9.17) is quite large. However, only 
11.46% have been involved in more than ten IJVs and the majority of companies (54.17%) 
have been involved in no more than three IJVs. The findings indicate that the majority of 
Australian companies involved in IJVs have relatively low experience in international inter-
organisational collaboration ventures. 
IJVs 
We review here characteristics of Australian companies’ IJVs. Companies may form IJVs 
with a single partner or with more than one partner. The majority of respondent’s IJVs are 
with one partner (87.37%). 
Table 5 Age of IJVs 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std dev. Median 
Age of IJV 1 39 6.60 6.53 4.00 
Age of IJV Companies % Cumulative % 
Up to 1 year 11 11.46 11.46 
2 to 5 years 45 46.88 58.33 
6 to 10 years 24 25.00 83.33 
Over 10 years 16 16.67 100.00 
 
Table 5 shows the age of IJVs. The average age of IJVs is quite high, 6.53 years. However, 
the lower value of the median indicates that half of the IJVs were less than four years old and 
as shown in Table 5, 11.46% had operated for less than one year. On the other hand, almost 
42% of the IJVs have survived over five years (the longest for 39 years). These findings 
provide two very important indications. First is that most respondents are involved with 
mature JVs. Second, the findings suggest good performance for Australian IJVs, given that 
survival is often used as a key proxy for IJV performance (for example, see Geringer and 
Herbert 1991; Hatfield et al. 1998). 
 10 
Table 6 Nationality of partners and area of operations of IJVs 
 Nationality of partners Areas of operations of IJVs 
Continent/Geographic Area IJVs % IJVs % 
China 28 29.47 25 26.32 
Rest of Asia 35 36.84 37 38.95 
Pacific 7 7.37 16 16.84 
Europe 12 12.63 4 4.21 
North America 9 9.47 2 2.11 
South America 1 1.05 1 1.05 
Africa 3 3.16 3 3.16 
Global   7 7.37 
 
Table 6 reports the nationality of respondents’ IJVs partners by continent/geographic areas. 
As one would expect, Australian companies prefer a JV with partners in nearby countries. The 
majority of Australian companies IJV’s partners are from Asian countries (China alone 
29.47%) and the Pacific region. Next is Europe, followed by North America, Africa and 
South America. With regard to the areas of IJVs operations, the majority operate in the 
country of the partner(s), although some exceptions are noticeable, especially for IJVs with 
European and North American partners operating in Asian and the Pacific areas. In fact, over 
80% of IJVs operate in Asian countries and in the Pacific region while only about 71% have 
partners from these geographical areas. Seven IJVs (7.37%) operate on a global basis. 
Respondents also indicated that 67 IJVs (69.07% of the total) operate only in the host country. 
Respondents indicated that their IJVs are involved in similar activities to those of their 
Australian parent companies. The majority of IJVs are involved in manufacturing (25.77%), 
mining (15.46%) and construction (10.31%). Only 14 IJVs (14.43% of the total) are involved 
in a business different from their Australian parent partner. Respondents also indicated that 89 
IJVs (91.75% of the total) are involved in a single line of business. 
Table 7 Level of resource contribution to IJV 
Type of resource Mostly by 
Australian 
partner (%) 
Shared with 
other partner 
(%) 
Mostly other 
partner (%) 
Technology 72.04 19.35 8.61 
Management expertise 58.06 29.03 12.91 
Material procurement 40.22 15.22 44.56 
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Marketing skills 31.46 47.19 21.35 
Customer service skills/facilities 31.11 44.44 24.45 
Product distribution 22.47 33.71 43.82 
 
Australian parent partners provide high levels of resources to their IJVs. The results reported 
in Table 7 indicate that Australian partners provide significantly higher levels of resources 
compared to their partner(s) in regard to the provision of technology and management 
expertise, and slightly higher with regard to marketing and customer services skills. The local 
partners, instead, make a more significant contribution with regard to product distribution and 
provision of material inputs. 
Provision of critical resources is a strong indicator of a higher level of bargaining power. The 
literature suggests that bargaining power between partners plays a very important role in 
shaping parent partner management control system choices (Yan and Gray 1994; Gray and 
Yan 1992; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Giacobbe 2007). According to the proponents of 
bargaining power theory, control of a JV depends on several factors determined by the ability 
of a partner to bargain with another. Bargaining power factors such as control over critical 
resources, the availability of alternative partner(s) and the strategic importance of the JV to a 
partner (stakes) would constitute power bases that can tilt bargaining power in one partner’s 
direction or another (Yan and Gray 1994; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Giacobbe 2007). 
Management Control Systems 
The literature suggests that control of IJVs is a very complex issue. Control of IJVs can be 
clearly distinguished from domestic operations or fully owned subsidiaries (Anderson 1990; 
Mjoen and Tallman 1997) and requires special attention. 
Parent partners are not free to fully control the operations of their IJVs. The presence of other 
partner(s) and the ‘sharing’ principle explicitly or implicitly accepted when it was decided to 
enter the IJV are significant constraints that limit their ability to exercise control. Geringer 
and Herbert (1989) provide a very useful model to aid in conceptualising the complex control 
dynamic of IJVs. They suggest that understanding of parent control in IJVs should consider 
the following three dimensions: 
(1) the focus of control; that is, areas of the operations of IJVs over which parent partners 
exercise control 
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(2) the extent of control; that is, the degree to which parent partners exercise control over 
the various activities of IJVs 
(3) the mechanisms of control; that is, the means by which control is exercised. 
Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the model. The model, either in its entirety or with 
regard to individual dimensions, has been widely used by scholars and researchers when 
investigating IJVs (for example, see Yan and Gray 1994; Groot and Merchant 2000; Chalos 
and O’Connor 2004). 
Mechanisms of 
Control
How do we exercise 
control?
Total
Dominant
Shared
Minority
None
Extent of      
Control
To what extent do we 
want to exercise control?
Focus of        
Control
What areas do we 
want to control?
Broad
Narrow
Formal
to
Informal
 
Figure 2 Dimensions of IJVs control 
Parent partners must identify and select the operational areas of their IJVs that they wish to 
attempt to control (Focus of control). Their choice ranges from only a few areas (narrow 
focus) to a larger set (broad focus). Also, individual partners’ ability to influence activities 
and decisions is limited by the presence of other partner(s). Thus, for each operational area 
individual partners may be able to exercise control on a continuum from ‘none’ to ‘total’ 
control (Extent of control). Finally, partners have choice as to the mechanisms of control, 
ranging from formal to informal, that they can seek to deploy to achieve the desired focus and 
extent of control. 
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Many factors may determine the actual ability of a parent partner to exercise control, 
including the level of trust in the other partner(s), motives for entering the JV, relative 
resources contribution, relative bargaining power and a partner’s international experience 
(Groot and Merchant 2000; Yan and Gray 1994; Giacobbe 2007). 
We now briefly review the three dimensions and report Australian parent partners’ assessment 
of management control systems aimed at monitoring their IJVs operations. 
Focus of Control 
According to Groot and Merchant (2000, p. 586): 
Partners can choose to have a broad control focus and attempt to exercise control over the 
entire range of the IJV’s activities, or they can have a narrow focus and confine their control 
activities to the few activities or performance dimensions they consider most critical. 
A parent partner’s selection of a range of operational areas of their IJVs to control has 
significant implications on the design and implementation of relevant management control 
systems. Choices are influenced by many factors limiting the ability of a parent partner to 
exercise total absolute control over all activities of an IJV. The presence of other partner(s), 
limited resources, expertise, power relationships, contingent factors and management of the 
relationship with other partner(s) are only some examples of these constraints. Empirical 
studies confirm the general inability of a parent partner to exercise exclusive and total control 
over all activities (Schaan 1988; Schaan and Beamish 1988; Geringer and Herbert 1989, 
1991; Yan and Gray 1994, 2001; Groot and Merchant 2000; Giacobbe 2007). Thus there is a 
need for parent partners to select areas of the IJVs’ operations they wish to control. 
Table 8 Managers provided to the IJV in the last five years 
Functional areas More than 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
The same as 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
Less than 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
Revenue and cost budgeting 51.11 27.78 21.11 
Development of new products/services 50.00 27.91 22.09 
Management of daily operations 44.57 27.17 28.26 
Capital expenditure approval 38.89 41.11 20.00 
Finance management 32.97 42.86 24.17 
General administration 28.57 34.07 37.36 
Human resources management 26.67 37.78 35.55 
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Pricing policy 26.44 47.12 26.44 
Public/government relations 24.18 21.98 53.84 
Marketing and distribution 22.73 37.50 39.77 
 
A key indicator of the focus of control exercised by Australian parent partners is the number 
of managers relative to the international partner(s) provided to the IJV over the last five years 
in major functional areas. The results are reported in Table 8. 
On average, Australian parent partners provided a larger number of managers than their 
international partners in planning and operational functions. These are the areas where they 
also make a more significant contribution of resources (see Table 7). In general, however, 
both partners appear to provide a significant number of managers in all other functional areas. 
This finding suggests that Australian parent partners may seek a relatively narrow focus of 
control. 
Other indicators of focus of control could be inferred from the composition of the JV board or 
management committee, and the right to appoint the IJV’s general manager. 
Table 9 reports on composition of IJVs board/management committees. Most IJVs share 
equal proportions of board/management committee membership; however, more Australian 
companies are in a minority position than those in a majority position. 
Table 9 IJVs board composition 
Australian parent (%) IJVs % 
Less than 50 31 32.98 
50 43 45.74 
More than 50 20 21.28 
Table 10 reports on the right to appoint the IJV’s general manager. The findings indicate that 
Australian partners are solely entitled to appoint the general manager in 35.05% of cases. This 
percentage is higher than the corresponding right of the local parent partner(s). 
Table 10 Appointment of IJVs’ general manager 
IJV general manager appointed by: IJVs % 
Australian-based partner 34 35.05 
Mutual agreement with other partner(s) 32 32.99 
Other partner(s) 23 23.71 
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In rotation with other partner 6 6.19 
Other 2 2.06 
Table 11 reports the right to appoint the IJVs general manager in three sub-groups of 
respondents sorted according to the position of the Australian partner in the IJVs’ 
board/management committee; minority, equal or majority. The data show that Australian 
parent partners, in general, are entitled to appoint more general managers to their IJVs than 
respective foreign partners when in either a position of majority or minority. More 
specifically, when in a majority position Australian partners appoint 80% of their IJV’s 
general managers, while their foreign partners in a majority position do the same in 25.81% of 
cases. Similarly, when in a position of minority, Australian partners have the right to appoint 
general managers in 19.35% of cases while their partners do so in 5% of cases. 
Table 11 Appointment of IJV’s general manager and IJV board composition 
 Australian partner position in IJV board 
IJV general manager appointed by: 
Minority 
(%) 
Equal 
(%) 
Majority 
(%) 
Australian-based partner 19.35 27.91 80.00 
Mutual agreement with other partner(s) 51.61 30.23 10.00 
Other partner(s) 25.81 30.23 5.00 
In rotation with other partner 3.23 9.30 5.00 
Other 0.00 2.33 0.00 
Extent of Control 
The concept of extent of control stems from organisational behaviour research and it refers to 
the centralisation or the locus of decision-making. Extent of control could be conceptualised 
as a dichotomous absolute variable (that is, total parent control or no control at all) or as a 
continuous variable (that is, dominant, shared or minority levels of control exercised over 
different strategically important activities). The literature indicates support for the 
conceptualisation of control as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable (Groot and 
Merchant 2000; Yan and Gray 1994; Giacobbe 2007). 
Parent partners may therefore exercise control over selected operational areas (focus) on a 
continuum from minority to total (extent). Their ability to set the extent of control is 
determined by factors similar to those influencing control focus, including the strategic 
importance attached to various areas of operations of their IJVs and the relative bargaining 
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power with other partner(s). Other factors that may determine the extent of control include 
parent partners’ superior knowledge of business processes and other operational aspects, 
ownership of technology and critical resources, which may determine a de facto total control 
position. 
The extent of control is indicated via the relative influence exercised by parent companies 
over the same set of IJV’s functional areas considered for focus of control. The results are 
reported in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Relative influence in the decision-making process of your IJV 
Functional areas More than 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
The same as 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
Less than 
our 
partner(s) 
(%) 
Capital expenditure approval 51.14 38.64 10.22 
Marketing and distribution 50.00 39.13 10.87 
Management of daily operations 45.16 27.96 26.86 
Human resources management 42.39 44.57 13.04 
General administration 40.66 42.86 16.48 
Pricing policy 35.87 36.96 27.17 
Finance management 31.52 41.30 27.18 
Public/government relations 27.17 16.30 56.53 
Revenue and cost budgeting 26.97 53.93 19.10 
Development of new products/services 25.84 49.44 24.72 
 
Australian parent partners exercise greater relative influence over a large number of 
functional areas of their IJVs, although in many cases they appear to share the decision-
making process with the local partners. ‘Public and government relations’ is the operational 
area where local partners exercise a more significant extent of control. 
In general, the findings suggest that Australian partners exercise a greater extent of control 
than their local partner(s) over a wider range of operational areas than those indicated as part 
of their focus of control. This may be a consequence of superior knowledge and/or ownership 
of critical business resources by the Australian parent partner. 
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Mechanisms of Control 
Mechanisms of control are tools used to exercise control ranging from strict rules and 
regulations to social activities. Research on management control systems suggests many 
different classifications of mechanisms of controls and we now briefly review some relevant 
to IJVs. 
Yan and Gray (1994, 2001) suggest that controls may be broken down into strategic, 
structural and operational. Strategic controls aim to determine and monitor goals, strategies 
and objectives of IJVs. Structural controls refer to the degree of autonomy allowed by parent 
partners to IJV management (that is, the extent to which the venture is authorised to operate 
as an autonomous unit). Operational controls refer to controlling everyday operations of the 
IJV. 
Bartlett (1986) suggests that mechanisms of control can be broken down into three groups. 
The first refers to context-oriented mechanisms; informal and culture-based controls aimed at 
establishing an organisational context. Examples may be emphasising teamwork rather than a 
you and us approach, or identifying staff as IJV’s employees rather than parent partners’ 
representatives. Content-oriented mechanisms are the second group and refer to direct 
intervention of parent partners through the IJV’s top management and board of directors. The 
third group includes process-oriented mechanisms. These mechanisms allow parents to 
exercise control from a distance, through the use of reporting requirements and indirect 
influence over the planning and decision-making process. Accounting procedures and 
performance measurement would be included in this group. Obviously, both formal and 
informal mechanisms of control form part of each group (and may be worthy of a separate 
classification). 
Groot and Merchant (2000) suggest classifying control mechanisms according to the object of 
control and to adopt Merchant’s (1998) classification of actions, results, and 
personnel/cultural controls. Parent partners could exercise action controls by imposing rules 
and procedures aimed, for example, at preserving assets, limiting decision-making and 
prohibiting the undertaking of certain courses of action. Results controls refer to mechanisms 
aimed at monitoring whether goals and objectives are being met, and may include 
performance evaluation and performance-related rewards and punishment mechanisms. 
Personnel and cultural controls include socialisation and peer control mechanisms aimed at 
encouraging positive performance. 
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Makhija and Ganesh (1997) classify control categories on a continuum ranging from highly 
formal to highly informal on the basis of the type of knowledge each partner seeks. They 
suggest that: 
The more predictable, regular, and explicit the information to be transferred, the more 
formal and structural the relevant controls are likely to be. In contrast, the more uncertain, 
ambiguous, and organizationally embedded the information, the more informal the controls 
will be. (p. 517) 
Fryxell et al. (2002) also distinguish mechanisms of control in a similar way as formal and 
social. Formal mechanisms include two groups: cybernetic and those aimed at protecting the 
assets of parent companies. These control mechanisms have two aims. The first is to detect 
behaviour and deal with this in a timely manner. The second is to reduce the potential for 
opportunistic use of resources contributed by a parent partner to the IJV. The authors indicate 
that mechanisms involving hierarchy, planning and reporting best fit in this group. Social 
mechanisms of control, instead, are designed to permit the ‘…evolution and inculcation of 
norms and values through structured personal interaction and training’ (Fryxell et al. 2002, 
p. 869). 
Fryxell et al. (2002) suggest that social control mechanisms can be very powerful as they 
ultimately give rise to ethical norms and behaviours that determine the most correct way of 
operating. Their aim is prevention through promoting cultural blending between managers 
achieved by socialisation processes and training involving the IJV as a whole. 
In summary, there are many classifications and definitions of control mechanisms. All exhibit 
significant similarities and where they differ; in fact, often complement each other. For 
example, the Fryxell et al. (2002) classification includes most of Merchant’s (1998) actions 
and results controls as part of formal mechanisms of control and most personnel and cultural 
controls as part of social mechanisms of control. 
In this survey we adopted the two broad categories of mechanisms of control suggested by 
Fryxell et al. (2002) relabelled as: 
(1) formal bureaucratic control mechanisms 
(2) social promotive control mechanisms. 
Table 13 Use of formal bureaucratic mechanisms of control 
Mechanism of control Used often Used 
sometimes 
Not used 
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(%) (%) (%) 
Planning and budgeting 79.12 14.29 6.59 
Formal authority relationship 68.48 17.39 14.13 
Standardised procedures and rules 68.13 18.68 13.19 
Supervision 58.70 27.17 14.13 
Contracts 50.55 25.27 24.18 
Performance evaluation 42.86 38.46 18.68 
Structural grouping and departmentalisation 31.87 28.57 39.56 
 
The results shown in Table 13 indicate high reliance of Australian parent partners on formal 
bureaucratic controls. Of particular interest is the frequent use of planning and budgeting 
(‘Used Often’ by 79.12% of respondents), formal authority relationships (68.48%), and 
standardised procedures and rules (68.13%). These suggest that despite the high level of 
environmental uncertainty typical of foreign operations, Australian parent partners choose to 
use a highly structured approach to control. 
Australian parent partners also rely, but to a lower extent, on the use of social and promotive 
mechanisms of control. The results reported in Table 14 indicate a higher reliance on people 
controls (meetings, groups, networking) than cultural controls (rituals, traditions and 
ceremonies). 
Table 14 Use of social promotive mechanisms of control 
Mechanism of control Used often 
(%) 
Used 
sometimes 
(%) 
Not used 
(%) 
Meetings and organised personal contact 63.74 24.18 12.09 
Networking and other socialisation processes 45.05 25.27 29.67 
Teams and taskforces 36.26 28.57 35.16 
Transfer of managers/lateral movements 24.18 29.67 46.15 
Rituals, traditions and ceremonies 16.48 31.87 51.65 
 
In summary, the results of this study indicate that Australian parent partners choose a 
narrower control focus, but exercise a greater extent of control over a wider set of activities by 
relying on more extensive use of formal mechanisms of control. 
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Parent Partner Influence on Design of Control System 
The literature indicates that the management and corporate style of parent partners may 
influence the set-up of their IJVs management control systems, with parent partners preferring 
features perceived to be similar to their own control systems (Groot and Merchant 2000; Firth 
1996). Parent partners perceiving similarities between the control of IJVs and control of their 
own operations may feel more confident with the working of the IJV control system, therefore 
adopting a more relaxed attitude towards the venture and their partner(s). Our investigation 
reveals that most respondents (72.16% of the total) feel that the management control system 
of their IJVs is similar to that of their company. Only 13.40% of respondents feel their IJVs’ 
management control system was different. 
IJV Performance 
The literature indicates that evaluating the performance of IJVs is a very complex issue as 
these ventures operate in complex, unfamiliar and unpredictable environments (Anderson 
1990). Thus there is a need to consider the use of a wide range of performance indicators able 
to link an organisation’s strategic determinants and its performance, incorporating accounting 
and market-based (Seth 1990), financial and non-financial performance measures. 
Geringer and Herbert (1991) note that efforts to identify variables associated with IJV 
performance have been constrained by disagreement concerning appropriate performance 
measures and methods. Reviewing the relevant literature, they indicated that some early 
studies used financial indicators such as profitability, growth and cost position, while others 
used objective measures of performance such as survival, duration, instability of ownership 
and renegotiations of JV contracts. 
Geringer and Herbert (1991) argue that objective financial measures of performance may not 
always be appropriate because most of the relevant information and data are not reported or 
published as returns from JVs to parents, which are generally internal and, in some cases, not 
able to be measured in financial terms. Subjective measures (qualitative factors) may be 
preferable, but due to their inherent limitation (subjectivity), they may not always produce 
correct results. The authors therefore tested several hypotheses regarding the reliability and 
comparability of a range of subjective and objective measures of IJV performance, and 
evaluated the relative utility of different data collection approaches. They found that objective 
measures were positively correlated with parent firms’ reported satisfaction with IJVs’ 
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performance and with perceptions of the extent to which an IJV performed relative to its 
initial objectives. The evaluation of the venture’s performance by one parent partner was also 
found to be strongly correlated to that of the other partner and to that of the management of 
the IJV itself. Thus, Geringer and Herbert (1991) concluded that: 
(1) in the absence of other performance data the use of subjective measures as reliable 
performance surrogates may be justifiable 
(2) it is appropriate to use a single parent company respondent for collecting performance 
data. 
In this survey we used a subjective assessment of IJV’s performance by asking respondents to 
indicate both their level of satisfaction with the overall performance of the IJV and the degree 
of satisfaction with the achievement of specific performance outcomes. The results are 
reported in Table 15. 
The performance outcomes cover a wide range of criteria that we grouped into three broad 
categories: learning performance, product/customer performance, and financial performance. 
Table 15 Degree of satisfaction with IJV performance 
Performance domains Satisfied 
(%) 
Neither 
satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
(%) 
Dissatisfied 
(%) 
Overall IJV performance 77.32 13.40 9.28 
    
Specific performance outcomes    
Learning performance 72.50 17.49 10.02 
Harmony with other partner(s) 82.02 14.61 3.37 
Ability to adapt to new environment 74.16 16.85 8.99 
Morale of people involved with IJV 72.22 16.67 11.11 
Learning about unfamiliar markets 75.64 12.82 11.54 
Ability to adopt innovation 68.24 21.18 10.59 
Learning about new technology 61.54 23.08 15.38 
Product/customer performance 70.69 22.05 7.25 
Product/service quality 76.47 18.82 4.71 
Product/service cost 71.76 21.18 7.06 
Customer satisfaction 71.60 22.22 6.17 
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IJV product/service price 62.50 26.25 11.25 
Financial performance 60.43 25.59 13.98 
Productivity 72.53 19.78 7.69 
Financial resources indicators 61.63 27.91 10.47 
Market share 62.34 22.08 15.58 
Profit 53.57 27.38 19.05 
Cash flow 51.19 30.95 17.86 
 
Overall, 77% of respondents perceive that their IJVs have performed satisfactorily, which is 
consistent with the mature nature of the IJVs reported in this survey, as it would be expected 
that high levels of dissatisfaction would led to IJV termination. In terms of specific 
performance outcomes for all dimensions, over 50% of respondents indicated their company 
was satisfied with the performance of their IJVs. Also, the overall level of dissatisfaction was 
low for each outcome. The highest satisfaction was with learning performance and the lowest 
with financial performance, consistent with other results reported in the literature. Finally, 
market share, profit and cash flow are the areas of lowest satisfaction and highest 
dissatisfaction, which were the most important motives for engaging in IJVs (see Table 3). 
Thus, while respondents were satisfied with IJV performance, it would be inferred that their 
performance aspirations were not fully met. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this study we have reported the results of a survey of Australian parent partners of IJVs. 
The survey collected data on general characteristics of Australian parent partners, their IJVs, 
their management control system choices and parent partners’ assessment of their IJVs’ 
performance outcomes. Geringer and Herbert’s (1989) dimensions of control model was used 
to investigate parent partner control of IJVs. The model suggests that parent partners are not 
free to totally control their IJVs and therefore choose operational areas they wish to control 
(focus of control), the extent to which they may control each operational area (extent of 
control) and how they exercise control (mechanisms of control). 
The results indicate that the majority of Australian companies have partners from countries 
close to Australia in Asia and the Pacific area, most IJVs operate in the country of their 
partner(s), and operations are usually limited to the host country. A significant implication of 
these findings is that IJVs of Australian companies are likely to operate in developing 
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countries/geographical areas where higher levels of environmental uncertainty and greater 
probability of conflicting interests with other partner(s) may generate special control issues. 
Australian companies engaged in IJVs have limited involvement in other IJVs. The literature 
suggests that experience may be a significant factor aiding parent companies with the 
complexities of sharing management and control with other partners, especially when 
operating overseas. Additional learning deriving from involvement in IJVs may allow a 
parent partner to better assess potential problems and make more relevant management 
control system choices, which, in turn, may impact on the success of new IJVs. As a 
substitute for direct experience, learning from the experience of others may also aid in this 
regard. 
The results indicate that the IJVs of Australian companies are involved in activities similar to 
those of their Australian parent partners, which contribute a significant amount of resources to 
their IJVs. These findings indicate that Australian parent partners may enjoy a superior 
knowledge of business processes and use of relevant technology, perhaps offsetting any 
disadvantages flowing from a relative lack of experience with the complexities of IJV 
management. Australian parent partners therefore may be positioned to better control relevant 
operational areas of their IJVs. On the other hand, their foreign partners may wish to take 
advantage of this knowledge by seeking control systems able to facilitate knowledge transfer 
and learning giving rise, thus, to shifting power positions over time. 
Similar motives drive Australian companies and their foreign partners to engage in JVs, 
however, with different degrees of importance. While profit and growth are important to both, 
motives related to knowledge acquisition are rated higher by the international partners. The 
literature indicates that different types of motives and, sometimes, conflicting objectives 
between partners may significantly impact on parent partners’ management control system 
choices (Giacobbe 2007) and on performance outcomes (Wakefield and Giacobbe 2008). 
Conflicting motives may place a heavy burden in selecting control systems. Each partner may 
be pushing for control of operational areas they feel are more strategically important to their 
motives and seek a degree of control and/or mechanisms able to aid in the achievement of 
their objectives. As noted earlier, transfer of technology and business processes knowledge 
may be a significant motive of many foreign partners of Australian companies. Over time, as 
the foreign partner acquires relevant knowledge, the initial advantage enjoyed by the 
Australian parent partners may be reduced giving rise to new power relationships and 
consequent de facto control of the IJVs operations. 
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Choosing the correct partner and, most importantly, managing and maintaining good 
relationships in the IJV are very important factors that may significantly impact on 
management control system choices and the long-term survival of the business venture. 
With regard to Australian parent partners management control systems aimed at monitoring 
their IJVs, most respondents feel that systems in place in their IJVs are similar to those used 
by their company. Australian partners provide more managers than their partner(s) in a 
limited number of their IJVs’ functional areas, but exercise significant influence over the 
decision-making processes of a larger set of functional areas. These indications suggest a 
narrower focus and greater extent of control. Australian parent companies use formal 
bureaucratic mechanisms of control more frequently than informal social promotive 
mechanisms of control. 
In general, respondents indicated satisfaction with the performance of their IJVs, although a 
higher level of satisfaction was reported for learning and product/customer performance 
dimensions than for financial performance. Little evidence is available in the literature on 
factors that may significantly impact on performance outcomes of IJVs. Suggestions from 
research indicate that parent partners exercising narrower control focus, more dominant 
control extent and tighter formal control mechanisms show a higher degree of satisfaction 
with their IJVs performance outcomes (Giacobbe 2007). 
Overall, the results of the survey indicate two major features of how parent partners control 
successful IJVs. The first deals with the selection of objects of control (focus of control) and 
the second with actual exercise of control (extent and mechanisms). 
Australian parent partners focus only on a limited set of control objects. They adopt a narrow 
control focus. This may be due to a number of factors. Objective factors such as the physical 
distance from the location of their IJVs and the lack of experienced managers are likely to 
have a significant effect in this regard. However, as noted earlier Australian companies are 
likely to enjoy a higher bargaining power to that of their foreign partners due to their superior 
knowledge of business processes and ownership of technology leading to de facto control of 
their IJVs. Australian parent partners may therefore seek to formally control a narrower set of 
their IJV operational areas. On the other hand, the foreign partner may seek formal control 
over a wider range of operational areas to facilitate knowledge and technology transfer. 
The second feature deals with extent and mechanisms of control. The results suggest that 
Australian parent partners seek tighter formalised structures. This is an indication of greater 
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extent of control achieved by using more formal bureaucratic methods. It could be argued that 
these choices may counter the limitations of narrow focus of control. Despite Australian 
parent partners formally controlling only a limited set of activities, they seek de facto 
dominant decision-making power in a wide range of strategically important functional areas, 
protecting, therefore, their overall interest in the venture. 
These findings are similar to those reported in the literature on management control systems 
used to control operations in international and inter-organisational settings (Pangarkar and 
Klein 2004; Mjoen and Tallman 1997; Fryxell et al. 2002). Cultural differences, geographical 
distance and the need to share information and decision-making with other partner(s) may 
limit the ability of parent partners to control a broader range of functional areas of their IJVs 
and require them to seek more formal and tighter controls over a limited set of control objects. 
Effective and efficient control is not limited to only one of Geringer and Herbert’s (1989) 
dimensions of IJVs control, but involves decisions and choices on each of the three 
dimensions, which may be affected by several factors including choosing the right partner, 
strategic motives, bargaining power, and the parent partner’s experience and involvement in 
other international joint ventures (Giacobbe 2007; Yan and Gray 1994; Groot and Merchant 
2000). A better understanding of these and other factors that may determine management 
control systems choices should be of great interest to practitioners and companies involved in 
international and inter-organisational operations. 
The results of this study provide important indications for companies involved in IJVs or 
planning to implement such a strategy. Controlling IJVs is always a challenge, both for 
experienced and inexperienced parent partners. The results of the survey provide interesting 
information on the characteristics of Australian parent partners of IJVs, their choices of 
management control systems and their IJV performance outcomes. Throughout this article, 
we have referred to indications of published research and put forward suggestions on potential 
factors that may influence parent partners’ management control systems choices and may 
impact on their IJV performance. 
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